Below is the
complete text of an email I sent to Nate Goldstein on Monday, October 18th,
2004. In it I describe an experience I
had on a route called Anthill Direct
(5.9S) in
In climbing one has
few, if any, opportunities to learn first hand from hard experiences—it is far
wiser to learn from the hard experiences of others. Herein I share one of my own hard
experiences, and a few of the lessons I learned from it.
Nate, had a near-epic on Anthill Direct last Friday. Got off route mid-P3. Went too
far left and into virgin territory on the South Buttress (I’ve finally
concluded Rossiter’s guide is worthless). Had to pull
hard, balancy moves 40 feet or so from my last pro,
which was more right of me than below me—I had no choice,
I was painted into a corner. I did my best to slot a #4 stopper a little closer
than that, but shortly afterwards I heard it go tinkle, tinkle, tinkle. Got to
a THIN, steep ledge and spent 20 minutes building an anchor consisting of two RPs and a red Tricam.[*]
Meanwhile, behind my partner I see what looks like a giant wind tunnel blowing
sleet and snow up canyon at high velocity (hey, the freakin’
weather forecast I checked before leaving home said 65 and sunny and, get this,
a 0% chance of precipitation! Guess I should have brought my transistor radio
to keep abreast of the very latest—jackass weather forecasters!).
It only got worse—a LOT worse—from there.
I belayed my partner John (not Fields) up, praying
like hell he wouldn’t fall (didn’t want to test the anchor on a hang, let alone
the massive pendulum that would have ensued had he fallen any farther than 20
feet from me). When he got to the crux about 10 feet from me he pondered the
moves and, before committing, asked me how solid the anchor was (recalling how
long it took me to construct it over audible cursing). I told him, “fine”. He
pulled the moves and took over the lead up an obtuse corner to a ramp. By now
the rain/snow mix was swirling all around us, reducing
visibility to maybe 50 feet. The temperature had dropped a good 20 degrees in
the last half hour or so. My partner, having climbed Anthill Direct 20 years ago, assured me he knew the
fastest way off the buttress—“Up and left”, he kept saying, “up and left”.
Unfortunately, we weren’t on AD anymore
and up and left meant winging it about two full rope lengths into
God-knows-what between us and somewhere between Tower Two and the summit of the
South Buttress. In one of the day’s fortunate “accidents”, I insisted that John
take a radio with him—just in case—after completing P1 (Touch and Go) since communication had been such a
challenge on that pitch. John is old school and pooh-poohed the suggestion that
we use radios, but thank God I insisted. On P4 of “never-never land” John
radioed alternately—and incessantly—for slack and up-rope, obviously trying to
find some way up and out of our predicament on high-angle and, by now, cold wet
rock. After maybe 30 minutes he radioed me to take him off belay. By now my
fingers and toes were completely numb, having been sitting on that lousy ledge
in the cold wet snow for the last hour. I climbed eagerly up hard, wet terrain,
knowing the exertion would warm me. I was so freakin’
cold, and the weather was deteriorating so fast, that I considered leaving
welded gear in the cracks rather than trying to work it free with the nut tool,
but thought better of it knowing we might need it later.
John had slung a largish tree at the bottom of a ramp and insisted on
continuing to lead because now *he* was cold. This made more sense anyway since
it allowed neither of us too much time sitting around “on ice”. Two more
slippery pitches, a long and a short, got us to the saddle—hallelujah! Except the fun was just beginning, Nate. The only descent
route from Redguard—the route from which we had *actually* topped out—is the East Slabs, a
descent I had never done and John had last done some 20 years ago (as you know,
several climbers have been killed over the years downclimbing
the East Slabs in *ideal* conditions). Add to this the fact that visibility was
maybe 50 feet and the slabs were completely drenched. We studied the beta—both
from Rossiter and printouts from
climbingboulder.com—in a swirling shit storm and could not for the life of us
figure out which way to go. There was no frame of reference in the low
visibility except for up and down. So, like rats in a maze, we went this
direction and that, each time running into the edge of a precipice or ever steepening terrain—mind you, this was solo on wet, low 5th
class terrain with numb hands and feet. Finally I said, “John, we have to go
down”. So down we climbed face forward, slowly, carefully. After maybe 20
minutes of this we reached a giant pine tree. We said f*ck it, ran the rope
around the tree and rapped into the fog, not having a clue what lay beneath us.
When we reached the end of the rope there was another tree—praise God! The
endless string of bad events had ended and now we had two positive ones in a
row—the tide was turning. The next tree had slings on it! As I arrived at the
slung tree the fog cleared just long enough to reveal the hulking mass of
When we got back to the car the thermometer read 37 degrees. I figure, top of
South Buttress being some 600 feet higher than the Eldo
parking lot, the temperature was a good two to three degrees cooler up there,
not including wind chill—and we were dressed for 65 and sunny (that’s not
entirely accurate—we both had rain jackets). The ring finger on my right hand
still hasn’t recovered all feeling.
Like I said, John is old school. He used to climb in
Hope all is well with you, Nate. Say hi to Linda.
Dave
So, having survived
the experience, what have I learned?
This requirement is so obvious it seems almost ridiculous to state. However, ask yourself, how many times have I been on a multi-pitch climb and wondered where the next pitch starts, or whether I’m still leading the current pitch? Each time I climb a route that neither my partner nor I has climbed before it seems there is always a spot or two where I have to stop and scratch my head. Knowing the way down is no less important—the descent can become more harrowing than the climb itself if you’re unsure how to get down.
What about a guidebook?
There’s no denying a good guidebook is an essential tool on any
climb. But pick up a copy of Richard Rossiter’s
There are several effective ways to ensure you don’t get
lost on a route. Perhaps the surest is
to climb a new route with a partner who has climbed it before and knows the
way. If that isn’t possible, find a
detailed photograph of the route (climbingboulder.com is an excellent source
for route photos), print it, and take it with you! Better still, go to the crag and do some
recon—study the route from a distance, follow every pitch with your eyes, and
take notes if your memory is not so good.
The bottom line: do whatever you
must to make sure there’s no confusion while you’re on the route. Of course, the same goes for the descent.
This requirement is obvious too but, nevertheless, it’s surprising how few climbers truly heed it. When you slot a nut or jam a cam, make absolutely sure it’ll hold a fall at least as long as the distance to your next placement. If you’re not sure it’ll hold then back it up with a second placement. If protecting a hard crux, do the same. Your life literally depends on placing solid gear throughout the pitch—gear that’ll withstand not only the enormous downward force produced by a fall, but also the outward force generated by rope play as you climb above the gear.
It really boils down to this: If you fall on lead and your last piece rips—either from too faulty or too distant a placement—you will likely die. Pick up a copy of Accidents in North American Mountaineering and it won’t take long to discover that the majority of rock climbing accidents and, by extension, fatalities, are caused by gear pulling. Or read the accident statistics tableau outside the Eldo outhouse—same story. The legendary Swedish mountaineer, Goran Kropp, was killed climbing moderate terrain (5.10a) because his last piece ripped.
This requirement is a bit harder to practice but a crucial one to be aware of. If intuition has ever steered you right you should have no difficulty understanding it.
The morning of October 15th intuition tried to
intervene, but I chose to ignore it. I awoke
with a feeling of foreboding that didn’t let up—not in the car on the way to
the crag, not on the hike approaching the climb, not on the climb itself. What I now know is that if I had been with a
partner with whom I had climbed before I would have backed out of the
climb. I would have simply said,
“Partner, I don’t have a good feeling about this. Let’s save it for another day.” But ego got the better of me. My partner that day was a colleague from work
with whom I had never climbed, and with whom I had been trying to schedule a
trip all summer long. Finally, on this
day, our paths merged in
So, if you get a bad feeling before committing to a multi-pitch climb, or even an afternoon of sport cragging, go do something else. Don’t try to understand your apprehension and conclude that, lacking a logical explanation, it must be groundless. Intuition works in mysterious ways, ways we may never understand, but over the course of a lifetime of climbing heeding its mysterious warning may save your life.
Sometimes the thrill of climbing overshadows its dangers and, to a degree, this is good—it allows us to focus on the rewards of climbing, not dwell on its possible consequences. But if we go too far in ignoring the consequences we invite sudden and unexpected disaster.
[*]In my own defense let me add some context here. Rossiter’s route description for P4, which I used for reference on P3, says to “Climb up into a shallow, right-facing corner…”. My actual belay stance was beneath just such a feature; a feature visible from the start of P3 and toward which I climbed, mistakenly believing that it marked the beginning of P4. Reinforcing this error is the fact that the path between P3 and P4 on Rossiter’s topo (Rock Climbing Eldorado Canyon, 2000, p. 320) is a straight line! In point of fact, the pitch first angles up and left, and then turns rather abruptly to near vertical at a black water streak. All this bad information led me to the faux belay, which I didn’t begin to suspect was wrong until the climbing became considerably harder than the 5.6 indicated in the guide. But downclimbing hard, unprotected terrain was not an option. Neither was going any farther, as farther was out of sight and could well have offered less in the way of belay options—hence the suicidal belay. Careful study of our actual line indicates that shortly after leaving Anthill Direct we intercepted the lower pitch of the lesser-known Red Ant (5.10c) route.